Robert Knudsen. White House Photographs. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, Boston. Digital Identifier: JFKWHP-KN-C20888.
Former U.S. ambassador to Moscow, with extensive knowledge of the Soviet Union, its language, history and culture, Thompson was described by Dean Rusk as “our in-house Russian during the missile crisis”. He supported the blockade and urged the President to accompany it with a demand that Khrushchev dismantle the weapons in Cuba. Thompson believed that in the end the blockade-ultimatum approach would probably still lead to a strike. However, “we do it in an entirely different posture and background and much less danger of getting up into the big war.” Thompson also influenced the President’s decision to respond to Khrushchev’s first, private, more conciliatory letter of October 26, ignoring the second, public, more aggressive statement, which raised the issue of a Turkey-Cuba trade. Thompson argued strongly against accepting such a bargain, which he believed would involve trading not just missiles for missiles, but everything from planes to technicians, leading to the effective abandonment of the U.S. base in Turkey. He suggested that the first letter Khrushchev had written himself and sent out without clearance, while the second, public statement was likely dictated by Politburo hardliners. Thompson argued that Khrushchev needed something he could use to save face: “The important thing for Khrushchev, it seems to me, is to be able to say ‘I saved Cuba; I stopped an invasion.’ And he can get away with this, if he wants to, and he’s had a go at this Turkey thing, and that we’ll discuss later.”